“Army, IAF, NDRF lead rescue operations”
“Army sets up 19 relief camps, nearly 1 lakh people rescued so far”
“Army reunites rescued newborns with parents”
“Heroic rescue operations by Army, IAF”
Such headlines have been doing rounds on newspapers and social media or have been flashing on your television screens. The recent Jammu and Kashmir flood was a major disaster that took several lives and will remain a scarred memory for the victims who lost their loved ones. The media was covering the flood extensively which led many NGOs, ministries, institutions, et al to provide relief funds for the people who were stuck in the massive flood. Mobile networks, basic amenities were all washed away for days at a stretch. People only lived on stock food and supplied materials.
Looking at various news clippings and footages, you will be able to deduce the mammoth coverage of the role played by the forces (Army, NDRF, CRPF, et al) in terms of relief and rescue operations. But, locals of Jammu and Kashmir had a different story to tell. They mostly resorted to the social media. The media may have narrated only a part of the story.
Othman Salim, a pathologist and a flood survivor, was helping coordinate medical relief Kashmir Voluntary Doctors’ Organization (KVDO). When the floods took a bad turn, Salim, like any other victim, was stranded at his house. He strategically used a toy boat to rescue each member of his family, carrying one member at a time, going back and forth. But, he was stranded by the end of it and a local boatman came to his rescue in North Kashmir. In the days that followed he decided to stay back and help in the rescue operations.
“There was no army to be seen. Not at Hyderpora. Across the bridge, the army had a presence. They had four boats there. One was malfunctioning. Most boats had intermittent issues with their motors. At times, they ran out of diesel. There were simply not enough boats. For every boat, one member of a family was allowed. Usually, up to four families. And, of course, one camera man”, said Salim. There were just not enough boats as thousand remained stranded and helpless. However, the number slightly increased later. Also, Salim’s friend was rescued by the NDRF.
At the SMHS hospital in Kashmir, situation was worsening. Eventually patients, doctors and nurses were rescued by locals. “Why was an army, which had the power to lock up a whole people, now, not able to save even half of them? No, the rescue operation was obviously not efficient. It was poorly coordinated. It was under equipped. Had my grandmother and my friend not had stocks of food like most Kashmiris do, they would have died”, said Salim, agitatedly.
Salim mentions how his friend told him about the forces rescuing mainly guests, officials and non-locals at Rajbagh. At SMHS, students and patients indicated the choppers to send some supplies. The supplies that were dropped went to the CRPF camp within the SMHS campus, claims Salim. Several patients lost their lives as the oxygen concentrator shut down, power failed, and no evacuation of sick patients took place. “They helped people. But they didn’t help enough people, in time. If your hospitals are left to be evacuated by locals, then your rescue operation has already failed, or you have some seriously skewed priorities”, said Salim.
Soon, local doctors had set up a medical camp and after a few days the Army set up its medical camp right in front of them. While the Army asked the local medical camp to join them, they refused. The Army medical camps were not well-equipped to handle the situation, mentioned Salim. “The army did set up several medical Camps in the days that followed. They were generally poorly equipped and ill-planned.”, claims Salim. “At our colony meanwhile, other young men and the boatman from Sopore continued to carry supplies in for those refused to leave. There was no police. There was no army. Young men, in make shift rafts, boats, on tyre tubes provided help. This was also the scene at Rajbagh”, said Salim.
Later, aid was provided from across India. Salim believes many locals did not work with the Army due to the fear that they would be used for an army “PR exercise”. Second, due to the general hostility of the public that was compounded by biased media reporting. The Army could only reach a part of the population and remained ineffective for the remaining.
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